Delegating Tax Collection Does Not Adversely Affect Demand for Accountability: Evidence from an Experiment in the D.R. Congo

While past scholarship finds that taxation catalyzes citizen participation, little is known about whether the delegation of tax collection to local non-state actors—a common practice in developing countries—undermines demand for accountability directed at the state. We examine a policy experiment in which 101 neighborhoods in Kananga, D.R. Congo, were randomly assigned to property tax collection by state agents or local city chiefs. We combine this source of variation with a novel behavioral measure of collective action in which 2,631 citizens could request community audits of an antipoverty program implemented jointly by the government and city chiefs. We find no evidence that the type of agent in charge of tax collection differentially affected citizens’ propensity to hold the state or chief accountable. The results indicate that low-capacity states can raise revenue by delegating tax collection to local leaders in urban areas without adverse consequences for bottom-up accountability.