with Ahrenshop M, Bergeron A, Paler L, Tourek G, Weigel JL. Working Paper. While past scholarship finds that taxation catalyzes citizen participation, little is known about how the delegation of tax collection to local non-state actors—a common practice in developing countries—affects the fiscal contract between citizens and the state…

with Callen M and Yuchtman N. Paper. Conditionally accepted, Annual Review of Economics.

We review an emerging experimental literature studying institutional change. Institutions are a key determinant of economic growth, but the “critical junctures” in which institutions can change are not precisely defined. For example, such junctures are often identified ex post, raising methodological problems: selection on the outcome of institutional change; an inability to study beliefs, central to coordination and thus the process of institutional change; and an in- ability to conduct experiments to identify causal effects...

with Balan P, Bergeron A, Tourek G. Paper.

Formalization always takes place against a backdrop of social institutions. Yet, whether social institutions are an asset or a constraint for formalization remains unclear….

with Kabue E. 2023. Economica. Ungated version. Published version.

How might fragile states escape a low-capacity trap in which citizens refuse to pay taxes and the government has too little revenue to increase enforcement or provide public goods? We argue that governments can initiate a virtuous cycle in which non-coercive and systematic tax collection improves perceptions of government legitimacy and increases intrinsic motivation to pay taxes.